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SOURCE

This information was obtained by Department of the Army interrogators and is forwarded essentially as received.

Rumanian System

1. The regular ship paneling procedure for SOVROMTRANSPORT vessels arriving at the port of Constanta began about two miles outside the port with the arrival of the harbor pilot who was accompanied by a Rumanian maritime border guard soldier (referred to by Rumanians as the "guardian angel"). The only duty of the border guard soldier known to source was to insure that there was no interference from the ship's personnel with the harbor pilot's duties and that the pilot returned to the harbor on completion of his duties. The pilot then brought the ship into the port basin and the anchor was dropped.
2. The first official to board a ship was the harbor doctor, who was a representative of the Ministry of Health. He boarded the ship in the basin, usually accompanied by one assistant. All medical inspections were made only by civilians. The doctor checked the ship's bill of health (patenta de sanatate), received the captain's report regarding any contagious diseases, vermin, sanitation, etc., and officially gave the captain permission to sail into the harbor and berth beside the quay. This inspection usually lasted about five minutes and was a mere formality. The bill of health checked by the harbor doctor was that received on departure from Constanta; not all foreign ports issued bills of health to ships entering or leaving their harbors. All SOVROMTRANSPORT vessels were required to be fumigated once every year; however, this was not the policy in effect because source knew of several ships which were not fumigated for 1½ years. Source never heard of any difficulties arising from a harbor doctor's inspection of SOVROMTRANSPORT vessels

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in the port of Constanta. Occasionally, the harbor doctor asked for a crew list which source believed was used to check that each crew member had received his annual physical examination. The two medical personnel left the ship when it tied up at the quay.

3. During the time of the harbor doctor's inspection, the crew and officers aboard SOVROMTRANSPORT vessels prepared customs declarations for items they wished to bring into Rumania and presented them to a ship's officer with the Seaman's Book. When the ship proceeded from the basin to quayside, all personnel were required to assemble in one room to await the boarding officials. A Rumanian border guard soldier was always present on the quay at the time the ship docked; source believed this guard was posted there just prior to the arrival of each ship. The boarding party usually arrived within 30 minutes after docking. During this period, nobody was authorized to leave the ship except the pilot, the border guard escort, and the harbor medical representatives. The boarding party usually consisted of one representative of the ROMTRANS Agency, one member of the Harbor Master's office, eight to twelve customs officials, and from 10-15 border guard personnel.
4. The ROMTRANS Agency representative, a civilian, reported to the ship's captain and received all the ship's documents relative to cargo in order to arrange the discharge and loading of the vessel. ROMTRANS was a port agency responsible for the arranging of all ship's business, such as berthing space, loading and unloading schedules, procurement of cranes, water, fuel, and stevedores. In the event that a foreign vessel had difficulties with the customs officials, a representative of ROMTRANS acted as the intermediary. Prior to the departure of all SOVROMTRANSPORT vessels for foreign waters, all ship's personnel were required to turn in their Rumanian currency to a representative of ROMTRANS. When the vessel returned to Rumania, this money was refunded to the ship's personnel by a representative of ROMTRANS.
5. The representative of the Harbor Master's office (Capitania Portului) reported to the ship's captain and received from the captain reports of weather conditions during the voyage, the ship's activities during the voyage, and collected all of the ship's documents. Prior to departure from Rumania for foreign waters, all ship's personnel were required to turn in their personal documents to the representative of the Harbor Master's office. These documents were returned after the representative of the Harbor Master's office, together with the border guard, had checked the crew's list, seaman's books, and crew's log.
6. The customs officials collected the customs declarations, checked the cargo documents, ship's financial accounts, ship's stores, and made a search of the vessel. Two to three of the 8 to 12 customs officials who boarded the ship were officers. This group was usually broken down into three groups; and, with a border guard soldier and a ship's crew representative, each group made a thorough search of a specific area of the vessel. This search usually lasted from two to three hours; however, source knew of one search that had lasted for six hours. The only undeclared items known to have been discovered during such a search were limited quantities of ordinarily-authorized import items, such as, stockings, cosmetics, women's clothing, and medicines. Source believed the only reason these items were not declared was because crew members were afraid they had brought in their duty-free quantity of these items and wanted to avoid the inconvenience of filling out all the necessary forms for so few items. Each SOVROMTRANSPORT seaman and officer who

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travelled to foreign waters was issued a customs book (carnet vamal) which designated the items and quantities that each seaman or officer was authorized to bring into Rumania duty-free during a one-year period. These items and quantities were: three suits of clothing (one each for a man, woman, and child), two pairs of shoes, two coats, two hats, two scarfs, 12 pieces of underclothing, including shirts, six pairs of socks, three pairs of stockings, one fountain pen, one wrist watch, four kilograms of cocoa or chocolate, four kilograms of coffee, one kilogram of pepper, 15 kg. of citrus fruits, four kilograms of bananas or figs, 15 kg. of flour, 10 kg. of cooking oils, 12 kg. of sugar, 250 g. of medicine, and four kilograms of canned fish.

7. When the crew left the vessel, they took the declared items to the Customs House which were checked against the customs declaration and noted in the Customs Book. These checks were very thorough and source seldom heard of anyone bringing in more than the authorized quantities; however, occasionally, customs approval was very difficult to obtain. Source recalled one incident when he had declared a bottle of penicillin, had it recorded in his Customs Book, but was not authorized to take it off the ship. On the next trip, he declared a second bottle and was reprimanded again for not declaring the bottle found in his cabin, previously declared, and which had been recorded in his Customs Book.
8. Customs controls were maintained to insure that imported items were not in sufficient quantities to be considered for commercial use and that their total value did not amount to more than the monies received by the individual for expenses in foreign harbors. Each ship's member received a pro-rated amount of English shillings for each day he was in foreign waters. This money was changed into the currency of the country visited and was provided as expense money. Most of the foreign currency was saved until clothing could be purchased; however, black marketing of medical supplies still continued on an individual basis. The prevailing blackmarket prices in Constanta at the time of source's defection were: Remifon, 200 to 300 lei for 100 tablets, and cortisone, 1,500 lei for 10 cu. cm. Source did not know the price of penicillin, streptomycin, or aureomycin, but estimated that 99 per cent of the crew purchased these medical supplies and sold them on their return to the home port of Constanta. Source spent all of his foreign currency for the purchase of English language publications on radio and associated fields.
9. Two of the 10 to 15 border guard personnel who boarded ships were officers. The border guard was responsible for checking the Seaman's Book against the crew's list and crew's log, helping the customs officials in their search of the vessel, and securing the ship's equipment. A check of the Seaman's Book against these documents was made on an individual basis with the seaman present when the ship's complement was assembled in one room. Each man was called individually before the border guard personnel to answer questions relative to entries on the documents. After completion of this document check, a report was made to the senior border guard officer and the Seaman's Books were collected. This check was very thorough and source knew of no instance where major discrepancies were noted. The usual complaint of the border guard was that the termination of the validity of a stamp had expired and renewal was necessary.

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10. Accompanying the border guard personnel were members of the security forces (securitate) who wore the uniform of the border guards. Source was once approached by a member of the security forces who asked source to work for them by providing them with various information. He was told at that time that a member of the security forces would contact him during the border guard inspection upon his return to Constanta in order to pick up this material. At another time, source noticed that one member of the border guard group wore a border guard jacket but wore trousers usually identified with the security forces.
11. The paneling procedure for SOVROMTRANSPORT vessels leaving Constanta for foreign waters consisted of all the ship's personnel turning in their Rumanian currency to a ROMTRANS Agency representative, the ROMTRANS representative giving the captain the bill of health issued by the port doctor, the harbor master's representative returning the ship's documents, stamping the crew's log, giving approval to leave the harbor, and collecting the personal documents of the ship's personnel. The border guard (graniceri) collected special passes issued to all personnel authorizing entrance to port installations and returned the Seaman's Books after inspecting the vessel with the customs officials. This search was thorough but lasted only one to two hours. The boarding party left the ship and the pilot, with a maritime border guard escort, came aboard; both left the vessel approximately two miles out of the harbor. Source assumed that this procedure took place in other Rumanian ports.¹
12. Source did not know of any time that the border guard or any other inspecting group sealed the radio room or put binoculars, radar equipment, rockets, and flares under seal but heard this was done on all foreign vessels, excluding ships of the USSR, which entered the port of Constanta. Although no weapons were carried on SOVROMTRANSPORT vessels, source was certain that any found on foreign ships would undoubtedly be placed under seal. He heard that small SOVROMTRANSPORT craft which sailed the Danube had their radio transmitters sealed while they were within 100 km. of the USSR border. SOVROMTRANSPORT personnel who had worked on these small ships told source that, when a ship entered the mouth of the Danube from the Black Sea, all radio transmitters and the switches connecting these transmitters to the antennas were also sealed. Source also heard that, even though the radio equipment was sealed, the radio operators were still required to communicate with the SOVROMTRANSPORT office. In such cases, the seals were broken by the radio operator and resealed before the ship left the Danube and entered the Black Sea.
13. All docks, piers, wharves, and quays in Constanta were guarded at all times by land-based border guard soldiers. Usually one guard patrolled an area where no ships were berthed and another guard was posted at the gangplank of each ship that was docked; two guards were posted aboard each vessel. The senior border guard officer of the boarding party made out a special pass for each crew member on completion of the document check aboard a ship. This pass authorized an individual to enter the port installation and had to be shown to all border guards, port police, and customs personnel whenever the individual left the ship or the port area. When an individual left the ship, the border guard at the gangplank took one-half of the pass and retained it until the person returned to the ship. These special passes were also issued to dock workers in the port of Constanta. When dock workers had to board a ship, they presented their pass to the border guard at the gangplank who checked the pass against the worker's identity documents. The border guard retained the identity cards and returned them only after the worker had left the ship. A few port officials had a permanent-type pass; source knew that the chief stevedore and the port navigation officer had such passes. Temporary passes were issued to technicians who were required to make repairs

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aboard ship and, whenever a radio technician boarded the vessel to make radio repairs, he was always accompanied by a border guard soldier.

Soviet System

14. Source described the Soviet ship paneling system from the procedures he experienced during trips to Poti, Batumi, Leningrad, and Klaipeda, Lithuanian SSR. He visited Poti twice, Batumi once, Leningrad once, and Klaipeda once.
15. Approximately 15 miles outside of each Soviet harbor, and always at night, SOVROMTRANSPORT vessels were met by a border guard patrol boat which escorted it to within two miles of the port. Here the pilot, accompanied by a border guard soldier, was taken aboard. The vessel then proceeded directly to the dock and tied up. The pilot and border guard escort disembarked and awaited the boarding party.
16. The boarding party consisted of one representative of the INFLOT Agency, a Soviet organization which handled foreign shipping, one representative of the Harbor Master's Office, three to four customs officials, one to two border guard officers, six border guard soldiers, and six unidentified civilians. Before arriving in a Soviet port, all personnel were cautioned not to throw anything over the side of the vessel; soundings, fishing, or bathing was also not allowed in Soviet waters. Approximately six to seven crew lists had been previously prepared for the officials; however, the information on the crew list differed from that required in Rumanian ports in that not only was the name, rank of individual listed, but also the Seaman's Book number, date and place of birth.
17. The port doctor, a civilian, boarded the ship first and inspected the bill of health, took the captain's report regarding sickness or accidents aboard the ship, checked the fumigation requirements, and gave the approval to the other officials to board the ship. This procedure was a formality and never lasted more than five minutes. In the event a member of the ship required medical treatment, the port doctor arranged for his admission to a polyclinic. The INFLOT representative arranged for ship supplies, unloading, loading, and administrative matters. The customs officials, in conjunction with the border guard personnel, made a thorough inspection of the vessel. Both customs and border guard personnel were very polite and asked each individual if he had any weapons, foreign currency, or foreign printed matter. All personnel were required to report to their cabins after the first ship inspection and underwent a second inspection which was not very thorough. During the second inspection, individuals were asked to declare all items in their possession. All ship's personnel were then required to assemble in one room and underwent a document check against the crew's list by the border guard officials. Until spring 1954, items of women's wearing apparel were not authorized to be taken ashore at Soviet ports and, because personnel were never physically inspected, they hid many of these items on their person. These items were then exchanged for rubles, entertainment, or souvenirs. At no time did any member of the ship incur difficulties resulting from these transactions.
18. During the documents check, a civilian from the local coastal radio station boarded the ship and sealed all transmitters, receivers, radar devices, binoculars, rockets, flares, and personal cameras. The usual method for sealing transmitters and receivers was to seal a main switch and, when possible, remove a radio tube or band the apparatus and then seal it. Only occasionally was the radio room sealed. Every effort was made to avoid this so that the radio room was available for minor repair work during the stay in port. At no time were personal radios placed under lock and key.

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19. After the border guard inspection was completed, the entire boarding party left the vessel. Two border guard soldiers were posted aboard the ship and one beside the quay. Within a day after the border guard inspection, a border guard officer returned to the ship and issued a special pass to each member. This pass had to be presented to all border guard personnel when leaving the ship, leaving and entering the port area, and returning to the vessel. It was sometimes checked against the Seaman's Book which the seamen had to have in their possession at all times and was valid until 2400 hours each day the ship was in port. In Leningrad, border guard personnel were not very strict in enforcing the time limitation indicated on the special passes issued to the crew members and seamen often slept in the town. At no time did source ever receive any instructions as to the area where he could travel after leaving the port installation. He assumed that the special pass was good only in town but believed that it could also be used when excursions were provided by the local club for seamen to visit places of interest outside the city limits. Source considered the personnel in Leningrad not as security-minded as those in Batumi and Poti.
20. The paneling procedure for leaving Soviet harbors was the reverse of that on entering. All arrivals and departures from Soviet harbors took place only at night.

Albanian System

21. From source's four 25X1X
he was of the opinion that there was no definite ship paneling system in effect at that port. Usually, only one person boarded a ship. Occasionally, an officer, of an unidentified organization, came aboard but usually a civilian representative of the port shipping agency. This latter individual was always accompanied by one soldier whom source believed was a member of the border troops. The boarding official always reported to the ship's captain and received a verbal report of the ship's activities, checked the names on the crew's list, checked the ship's stores, and made out a customs statement relative to only those items aboard the ship that were considered the ship's food supplies. At no time was a physical search made of the vessel or the ship's crew.
22. Special passes were usually issued one or two days after arrival but very limited control was placed on the movement of personnel departing or arriving on the ship or port installation. The ship's radio transmitters and receivers were placed under seal. Over a period of three years, the security measures taken had been very limited but seemed to be improving. 25X1X

Bulgarian System

23. Source visited the Bulgarian harbor of Burgas only one time,
He was unable to provide any ship paneling information because he was told by the ship's captain to rest after completing more than 24 hours of continuous work prior to arriving within the harbor area. The ship remained only two nights in the port and nobody was allowed to leave. The radio transmitters and senders were sealed.

Effectiveness

24. The ship paneling procedures undertaken in all Soviet and Satellite ports were very effective in preventing unauthorized persons from leaving and entering the country and prohibited large-scale organized smuggling because of the detailed inspections required prior to unloading on arrival and after loading and awaiting departure from the harbors. The major weakness noted by source regarding the

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procedures was that, although all boarding parties included large numbers of personnel, the individual member of each inspecting group was not very well trained for his job. Source was convinced that old seamen could find many ways and places to hide small items desired to be brought into these countries. The organized inspection procedures, coupled with the well-established informer nets aboard each ship and in each harbor, discouraged violation of prescribed directives by ship's personnel.

25. [] source learned of smuggling activities aboard a SOVROM-TRANSPORT vessel. In that year, the TRANSILVANIA made a port call at Haifa, Israel. Ordinarily, SOVROMTRANSPORT vessels stopped for one full day in this harbor but, because of heavy port traffic and bad weather, the TRANSILVANIA remained only one-half day at Haifa. When it returned to Constanta, the regular customs search turned up large unknown amounts of foreign currencies (US dollars, gold Napoleons, English pounds), gold, and jewelry hidden along the corridors. An investigation determined that this material was being smuggled out of Rumania into Israel by members of the ship's mess. About three months after this incident, the ship's steward was taken into custody. Source believed that these items were being smuggled out of Rumania by the Jewish community for Jews, then in Israel, who had left property in Rumania when they fled the country.

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